

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

25 APR 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security  
SUBJECT : Security Policy Review

1. Action Requested: You stated in your 12 April 1974 morning staff meeting that a major goal for CY 1974 would be a complete review of all security policy documents to assure that the policy foundation of the Office of Security is accurate, valid and up-to-date. You requested me to design an administrative attack on this undertaking. A plan and procedure to accomplish this goal is outlined and submitted for your approval. A recommendation for such approval is submitted in paragraph 3.

STATINTL

2. Basic Data:

a. As stated in [REDACTED], the primary mission of the Director of Security (i.e., the Office of Security) is the preparation and execution of the Agency's security program. Assuming this statement to be currently valid, a review of all security policy documents should focus on this criterion. Another valid assumption is that the purpose of this review is not only to assure that the policy foundation of the Office of Security is accurate, valid and up-to-date, but to identify any areas where resources are being expended without basis of policy requirement or based on policy requirement not directly in support of the Agency's security program and under current circumstances where a net advantage is no longer accruing to the Agency.

b. A review of all security policy documents to be found in Headquarters Regulations, Notices and Handbooks, Office of Security Directives and DCIDs is a massive undertaking requiring the cooperation of many people. Since security policy has purpose only if represented by some activity implementing policy, this review could best be accomplished by reviewing

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

again, and identifying in detail, each discrete activity of the Office of Security. The major effort of such a review was accomplished last November 1973, when some fifty-eight functions were identified as being representative of the Office of Security. Each responsible component would break its functions down to the lowest common denominator and identify the policy basis for each and every discrete activity. Such identification would be a precise citation to Headquarters Regulation, Notice or Handbook, Office of Security Directive or DCID. If no policy basis could be found applicable, this too would be indicated.

c. Following the marriage between each discrete activity and policy citation or lack thereof, the manager for the function under which the activity fell would further evaluate the activity in terms of its contribution to the Agency's security program, to the security program of the Intelligence Community, or to the security program of the United States Government at large. The evaluation should indicate why the activity was undertaken, when, and if its continuation is worth the expenditure of the resources involved in terms of a positive contribution to the Agency's security program. Where the activity supports the security programs of the Intelligence Community or the United States Government at large, specific emphasis should be given to the benefits being derived by the Agency in terms of the resources being expended in behalf of the activity.

d. Once such a review as outlined above is completed, the Plans, Programs Branch/PP&AD would be in a position to collate the data in terms of valid policy, outdated policy, or gaps in policy justification. A thorough review of the activities of the Office of Security would have been completed for FY 1975. The employees of the offices would have undergone some personal, soul-searching and analysis concerning what they are doing, why they are doing a certain activity, and what justification in terms of policy exists for their effort. Managers in the Office of Security at higher policy levels would have a useful tool to assist them in identifying marginal activities in the sense of net benefit to the Agency's security program.

3. Recommendation: It is recommended that the plan outlined in paragraph 2 above, to be implemented under the executive direction of the Plans, Programs Branch, PP&AD, be approved.

  
STATINTL

Deputy Director of Security (P&amp;M)

STATINTL

APPROVED: 

30 APR 1974

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

## Distribution:

Orig - Return to PPB  
1 - D/Security

☐ UNCLASSIFIED☒ INTERNAL  
USE ONLY☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ SECRET

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Security Policy Review

FROM:

AC/PPB

EXTENSION

5311

NO.

STATINTL

DATE

22 April 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DD/P&amp;M

25 APR  
1974

J.S.

2.

D/Security

25 APR  
1974

S

3.

DD/Security

26 APR 1974 30 APR 1974

J.S.

4.

DD/PPM.

30 APR  
1974

J.S.

5.

C/PPM Ad

30 APR 1974

J.S.

6.

AC/PPB

This is a good flaw but there probably functions such as those in the EAB area which weren't considered in the '73 revised text which should be considered at this time.

STATINTL

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

☐ SECRET☐ CONFIDENTIAL☒ INTERNAL  
USE ONLY☐ UNCLASSIFIED